

# The Role of Religious Fundamentalism and Tightness-Looseness in Promoting Collective Narcissism and Extreme Group Behavior

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The present study aims to understand the roles of religious fundamentalism and collective narcissism in predicting extreme behavior. It was hypothesized that religious fundamentalism may enhance collective narcissism and that this would in turn increase the tendency to endorse extreme behavior. It was also anticipated that perceptions of social tightness would moderate the indirect effect of religious fundamentalism on extreme behavior through collective narcissism. To test the hypotheses, we collected data from 787 members of Islamic religious groups in Indonesia (male = 457, female = 325); ages ranged from 17 to 52 ( $M = 25.14$ ,  $SD = 8.49$ ). Supporting the hypotheses, our findings demonstrated the validity of the expected pathways, confirming that it is important to consider the role of collective narcissism and tightness-looseness when studying relationships between religious fundamentalism and extreme behavior. Our findings demonstrate that when religious fundamentalists are able to see their cultural values in a loose way or more dynamics, they may become less narcissistic collective and less support for extreme behaviors.

**Keywords:** religious fundamentalism, collective narcissism, tightness-looseness, extreme behavior

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The establishment of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Libya in 2014 prompted increased international concern about violent extremism, not only in Western countries but also in predominantly Muslim ones (Poushter, 2015), including Indone-

sia. Some surveys have also indicated that extremism is becoming increasingly pervasive in Indonesia. For instance, in 2016, USAID estimated that between 1,000 and 2,000 Indonesians had pledged allegiance to ISIS, and during the same year, the Indonesia police force officially recorded 170 terrorism cases, a number double that compared with the preceding year.

One factor that is widely recognized to play an important role in explaining violent extremism is religious fundamentalism (RF; Ben-Dor & Pedahzur, 2004; Harris, 2002; Rausch, 2015; Rogers et al., 2007; Rothschild, Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009; Taylor & Horgan, 2001). The proposed connection between fundamentalism and violent extremism is that religious fundamentalists are strongly committed to their specific religious practice/ideology and believe it imperative that other members of their religion follow the pure and correct teaching (Juergensmeyer, 2011; Rausch, 2015). For religious fundamentalists the world over, the modern secular world is a threat to achieve some desired theocratic state, and consequently they seek to protect and promote their religious teachings (Gregg, 2016). This goal is pursued through a variety of means, which include democratic peaceful efforts to influence society and associated laws based on what they perceive as divine law, efforts to establish a theocratic state (Muluk, Sumaktoyo, & Ruth, 2013), or, alternatively, acts of violence, such as terrorist actions (Rausch, 2015). In the Western public imagination, religious violent acts are typically associated with Muslim extremists, in part because of the salience of high-profile attacks,

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including the September 11th high-jackings by Al Qaeda and the November 2015 Paris attacks by ISIS supporters. However, religious extremism is not restricted to any specific religion, as demonstrated by the recent support for attacks on the Rohingya by Buddhist extremists in Myanmar or attacks on abortion clinic workers by Christian extremists in the United States. Such violent attacks have led to a widespread view that RF is always associated with violence and terrorism and thus should always be opposed.

However, the reality in most countries is that RF would be very difficult, if not impossible, to suppress. For instance, in a national survey, [Muluk et al. \(2013\)](#) revealed that the mean score of RF for the general Muslim population in Indonesia was quite high ( $M = 3.96$  on a 5-point scale). Similarly, in another multistage random sampling survey conducted recently in the capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta, [Yustisia and Anugrah \(2018\)](#) found the average level of RF among the general population to be even higher ( $M = 6.11$  on a 7-point scale). Given this is not a situation exclusive to Indonesia, it is crucial to better understand religious fundamentalist beliefs and how they can be managed so that they do not necessarily lead to increased willingness to perform or support extreme behaviors (EBs). The present study seeks to contribute to this effort by exploring variables that might link RF to increased support for violent extremism.

### RF and EB

Religious fundamentalism broadly could be defined as sincere and committed faith to a specific religious teaching ([Juergensmeyer, 2004](#)). For fundamentalists, their religious teachings provide the absolute truth about humanity and the nature of God(s) and specify how this truth must be upheld. Typically, this involves following the practices prescribed in texts deemed to be the most original and sacred and the practices of early communities. A corollary of these views is that those who oppose the truths accepted by fundamentalists are evil and must be vigorously opposed and fought ([Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992](#)). A number of previous studies have therefore sought to investigate the role of religious fundamentalist beliefs on religious ethnocentrism and intergroup aggression (e.g., [Altemeyer, 2003](#); [Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005](#)). These studies have collectively demonstrated that RF is one of the key predictors of support for terrorism ([Pech & Slade, 2006](#); [Putra, Danamasi, Rufaedah, & Arimbi, 2018](#); [Taylor & Horgan, 2001](#); [Verkuyten, 2018](#)). Despite such general associations, it is also clear that in the specific context of Islamic fundamentalism, RF does not necessarily result in increased EB, including violent actions. Indeed, as discussed above, certain Islamic fundamentalist groups active in Indonesia, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), acknowledge that they are seeking to create an Islamic state and establish Islamic law while overtly condemning violent actions ([International Crisis Group, 2003](#); [Mohamed Osman, 2010](#); [Putra & Sukabdi, 2014](#); [Ward, 2009](#)). Nonetheless, the government banned this organization in 2017, deeming it a threat to national unity ([Counter Extremism Project, 2018](#)).

A number of studies have begun to examine additional factors that could explain the relationship between RF and extremism. For instance, stronger RF may increase the perception that the values of religious groups face a threat from secularism and could increase engagement in defensive responses ([Beller & Kröger, 2018](#); [Gregg, 2016](#); [Rogers et al., 2007](#)). Furthermore, [Juergensmeyer](#)

(2001) emphasized that fundamentalist groups tend to adhere to the concept of a cosmic war between religious and secular values in which there can only be one victor. If any group loses this battle, it can damage personal dignity and cultural pride.

Building on the findings of previous studies, it seems reasonable to anticipate that RF will be associated with individuals demonstrating greater favoritism toward their relevant religious ingroup. [Altemeyer \(2003\)](#), for example, found that RF correlates with religious ethnocentrism (i.e., a tendency to make “ingroup vs. outgroup” judgment based on religious affiliations) and prejudice. Part of the explanation for this is that religious fundamentalists are strongly identified with their religious group ([Saroglou, 2016](#); [Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010](#)), and as proposed by social identity theory, strong ingroup identification can lead to both ingroup favoritism and intergroup discrimination ([Perry, Priest, Paradies, Barlow, & Sibley, 2018](#); [Tajfel, 1981](#); [Tajfel & Turner, 1979](#)).

Yet while there is clear evidence that RF can result in a strong ingroup bias, it is important to note that such a bias does not necessarily result in pronounced outgroup negativity. [Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Iskra-Golec \(2013\)](#), for instance, has suggested that positive ingroup regard only causes outgroup negativity when it is conflated with narcissism (i.e., excessive ingroup love). And other studies have similarly reported that narcissism is related to high private collective self-esteem but low public collective self-esteem and that it predicts perception of threat, unwillingness to forgive the outgroup, preference for military aggression ([Golec de Zavala, Eidelson, Cichocka, & Jayawickreme, 2009](#)), prejudice ([Cai & Gries, 2013](#); [Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012](#)), and defensive responses to potential cultural threats ([Gries, Sanders, Stroup, & Cai, 2015](#)). In a recent study, [Chichocka and colleagues \(2017\)](#) also found that the effect of ingroup positivity on outgroup attitudes is influenced by personal control. That is, higher perceived personal control can lead individuals to develop a nonnarcissistic ingroup positivity, which can in turn produce a more positive outgroup attitude. Building on this existing literature, the present study seeks to better understand how RF relates to the endorsement of EB and address whether it causes individuals to favor their religious ingroup in an excessive manner.

### The Role of Collective Narcissism

Religious fundamentalists can be considered individuals who possess strong identification with their religious group ([Saroglou, 2011](#); [Ysseldyk et al., 2010](#)). According to social identity theory (SIT; [Tajfel & Turner, 1979](#)), once individuals belong to a social group, they use the group as a primary source of self-esteem. In order to maintain self-esteem, individuals evaluate their ingroups more positively than outgroups. In the case of RF, positive ingroup regard appears to reach an extreme level (see [Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010](#), for a review). As suggested earlier, this is likely due to religious fundamentalists’ beliefs that their religion alone is the sole source of “truth.” Such extreme ingroup love has been described recently under the concept of *collective narcissism* (CN).

Collective narcissism was a concept introduced by [Golec de Zavala et al. \(2009\)](#). They defined it as the emotional investment in an unrealistic belief about group greatness resulting from strong ingroup identification. In the personality psychology literature, narcissism is defined as an inflated sense of self that causes

individuals to feel superior, behave arrogantly, and possess a constant need for attention and admiration (Bogart, Benotsch, & Pavlovic, 2004). Previous studies have shown that CN can lead people to have an exaggerated evaluation of their ingroup. Recent research has also demonstrated links between partisan, nationalist political movements, such as support for Brexit and populist policies (Marchlewska, Cichocka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, & Batayneh, 2018) and for Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential election (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018). In other studies, it has been found that higher CN was associated with a greater tendency among Americans to exaggerate their home state's role in American history (Putnam, Ross, Soter, & Roediger, 2018) and citizens of 35 countries to overestimate their countries' role in world history (Zaromb et al., 2018).

Collective narcissists seek to amplify their ingroup greatness, and this is associated with a tendency to evaluate outgroups more negatively. This can be understood as a strategy to maintain a positive ingroup image and as a reaction to those who do not admit and display admiration for their group greatness (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). For CN to be an important factor also does not require the gaps between ingroups and outgroups to be large. Freud is usually credited with introducing the concept of "the narcissism of small differences" (Freud, 1989), which posits that groups that are culturally or geographically similar often demonstrate intense intergroup rivalry due to a greater sensitivity toward details of differentiation. For religious fundamentalists, who are focused on their group's precise literal interpretation of sacred texts, matters of minor disagreement with other related religious groups, including other fundamentalists, can thus take on a disproportionate significance.

Previous studies have provided evidence that CN can cause outgroup negativity, such as increased perception of threat from outgroups, an unwillingness to forgive outgroups, a preference for military aggression (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), intergroup hostility (Golec de Zavala, 2011; Golec de Zavala et al., 2013), antisemitism (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012), and endorsement of conspiracy theories (Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018). However, more than just outgroup negativity, CN can also lead to intergroup aggression. One major reason associated with this outcome is because CN can induce individuals to be more sensitive toward threats to their ingroup (e.g., Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Gries et al., 2015; see Cichocka, 2016, for reviews). The hypothesized pathway is that individuals displaying high levels of CN will be concerned with protecting the "greatness" of their self-image and thus desire that outgroups acknowledge this "greatness." If they find that particular groups fail to demonstrate adequate praise and admiration for their group, this can result in anger and potentially aggression. Therefore, intergroup aggression derived from CN can be understood as a strategy to control the external validation of an ingroup's perceived greatness (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009).

Preliminary evidence of the relationship of RF and CN has been provided by studies examining the relationship between ingroup identification and ingroup bias (e.g., Cairns, Kenworthy, Campbell, & Hewstone, 2006; Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Lyons, Kenworthy, & Popan, 2010; Wann & Grieve, 2005). The relevant finding from these studies derives from SIT and posits that once individuals belong to a social category, they will

be more likely to favor their ingroup over outgroups. Yet in the particular case of CN, the unrealistic form of ingroup favoritism is frequently accompanied by outgroup negativity (Golec de Zavala, 2011). Consequently, we predicted that RF would be associated with CN, since religious fundamentalists are likely to be more narcissistic about their preferred religion. That is, the strong belief that their religion provides the truth is likely to lead to the belief that the world would be better if run according to their religious values and to demand that others also acknowledge the greatness of their ingroup.

### The Role of Tightness-Looseness

Previous studies have shown that the relationship between RF and EBs is influenced by a number of contextual factors. For instance, a circumstance that needs to be taken into account in evaluating such a relationship is the norms that are shared within a particular group. Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, and Busath (2007) in an experimental study on believer students in Utah, for example, found that levels of aggression were higher when participants were told that a violent passage they read was sanctioned by God and taken from the Bible. This finding suggests that support for aggression depends on the salient religious values. In a different religious context, Putra and Sukabdi (2014) similarly found that RF was less likely to produce support for violence among Muslims when they held stronger beliefs that an Islamic state could be established through peaceful means. Rothschild et al. (2009) also found that while RF was associated with extreme support for the military, this relationship was moderated when the participants were primed with compassionate religious values. In summary, while a variety of studies demonstrate a relationship between RF and outgroup discrimination, including support of violence, there is also clear evidence that the relationship can be strongly impacted by contextual factors. This problematizes any straightforward causal claims and reinforces the need to pay attention to potential moderators.

Related to this, we hypothesize in the present study that the effect of RF on EB will be impacted by the strength of social situations. This hypothesis was developed from previous findings that the effect of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) on intergroup attitudes varied depending on social context. RWA is one of the main characteristics of RF (see Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1996; Tibon & Blumberg, 1999) and refers to covariant traits of authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1981). Those with high RWA would be more likely to be obedient to authority, be more hostile toward outgroups, and display concern about ingroup deviance from established rules of "proper behavior" (Altemeyer, 1988).

One study by Harnish, Bridges, and Gump (2018), for example, demonstrated that RWA increases support for conservative policies in the United States. Alternatively, in Moscow—where communist-inspired social norms emphasize equality—RWA displayed a positive association with support for equality policies. Oyamot, Borgida, and Fisher (2006) found that RWA among White Americans was negatively associated with immigrant evaluation (i.e., African American) for those with lower egalitarian belief. Also, Liu, Huang, and McFedries (2008) reported that the RWA of formerly subordinate groups could increase following a narrow electoral victory in China (Liu et al., 2008).

In relation to religion, previous studies have found that different features of religious traditions can impact social cohesion and in certain cases the willingness for members to sacrifice for their group. In particular, there has been growing interest in the effect that participation in different types of ritual activity can have on progroup attitudes and behaviors (Fischer & Xygalatas, 2014; Watson-Jones & Legare, 2016; Whitehouse & Lanman, 2014). Xygalatas et al. (2013), for instance, found that during the Tamil Hindu Thaipusam festival in Mauritius, both participants and observers of more highly arousing piercing rituals were more generous toward their ingroup than those who performed low-arousal prayer.

The important role of ritual traditions and their relationship with group bonds has also been demonstrated to extend beyond religious groups. For example, rebel groups that practice high-arousal “imagistic” rituals often organize into intense relational groups (Whitehouse et al., 2014), while those with low-arousal “doctrinal” rituals are more likely to display broader and more diffuse group bonds. Focusing specifically on the issue of extremism, Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan (2009) found that regular attendance at religious services was positively associated with both endorsement of suicide attacks and outgroup hostility. The practices of religious fundamentalists, however, can be variable, with some performing frequent, low-arousal “doctrinal” rituals (e.g., daily prayers for Muslims, reciting the Quran) and others involved with more rarely performed high-arousal “imagistic” rituals (e.g., painful initiations; Atkinson & Whitehouse, 2011; Whitehouse, 2004). The precise effects of different ritual practices on cohesion is a topic that requires further research, but it seems likely that differences in practices will have an impact on the endorsement of EB, intergroup discrimination, and the level of RWA (Whitehouse, 2018; Whitehouse, McQuinn, Buhrmester, & Swann, 2014).

An important sociocultural factor that has been examined in relation to extremism is tightness and looseness (Gelfand, Lafree, Fahey, & Feinberg, 2013; Realo, Linnamägi, & Gelfand, 2015). This refers to the strength of norms and tolerance for norm deviance in a given group or society (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006). In a study of 33 nations, Gelfand et al. (2011) found that in societies with high tightness, behaviors judged as deviant were regarded as less acceptable (e.g., homosexuality, divorce, prostitution), and people believe that their way of life needs to be protected, prefer to have nonforeign neighbors, and are more likely to regard their culture as superior.

Using the Global Terrorism database, Gelfand et al. (2013) found that fatalistic beliefs, rigid gender roles, and greater tightness are associated with more terrorist attacks and fatalities. In particular, they found that tightness scores were related to the overall lethality of events. Gelfand et al. (2013) attributed their findings to the fact that societies with greater tightness have higher levels of monitoring and stronger punishment for norm violations (Gelfand et al., 2011). These conditions result in ingroup members having stronger motivations to behave in accordance with accepted group norms. For example, if a group prescribes that violence is permitted in order to maintain the group’s status or value, members will endorse this view. Ingroup members of tighter groups are more sensitive to potential violations of ingroup norms as these actions are perceived as a threat to group beliefs. In a large multinational country, Gelfand et al. (2011) found that societies with higher levels of tightness also had higher levels of historical

and ecological threats, including territorial threats from neighbors, and greater levels of natural resources.

Divergences in religious fundamentalist groups in regards to the level of support for the use of violence may thus be connected to the relevant level of tightness of religious fundamentalists. Perceptions of tightness can also vary between different social levels. For example, some might report higher levels of tightness among their subgroup (religious groups) but lower levels of tightness among some superordinate group (nation). Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver (2007) discussed this issue and propose that there are always likely to be variations of tightness and looseness both across and within cultures.

Applying these insights to the relationship between RF and EB, we expected that scores of tightness-looseness would moderate the effect of RF on CN. Specifically, we posit that religious fundamentalists would be less likely to demonstrate excessive ingroup love when they had looser adherence to social norms and thus were more likely to be tolerant of violations. With lower levels of tightness, religious deviants are less likely to be perceived of as a threat to fundamentalists’ core beliefs and thus are less likely to generate insecurity concerning the perceived “greatness” of their group.

### The Present Study and Hypotheses

The present study has two main goals: First, we examine a potential mechanism underlying the relationship between RF and EB, addressing the mediating role of CN. This theoretical model was derived from findings from previous studies, which indicate that religious fundamentalists possess high levels of ingroup love. Secure ingroup love can in certain circumstances be beneficial since it can refer to a constructive love that involves self-criticism for the sake of group goodness (Cichocka, 2016). However, in certain contexts, ingroup love can be associated with heightened intergroup hostility (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), anxiety (e.g., Salzman, 2008), and disgust sensitivity (e.g., Choma, Haji, Hodson, & Hoffarth, 2016). Among Muslims, CN has been found to have an association with fear (e.g., Kim-Prieto & Diener, 2009) and perceived levels of intergroup threat (Canetti, Halperin, Hobfoll, Shapira, & Hirsch-Hoeffer, 2009). Thus, in a predominately Muslim religious context, it could be a factor promoting individuals to be more defensive (Cichocka, 2016). Based on the findings of previous studies, we anticipated that RF would enhance CN and that this in turn would increase the tendency to endorse EB (Hypothesis 1).

Second, we sought to better clarify whether greater RF is always associated with greater endorsement of EB. We expected that this relationship would vary according to the cultural values shared by the relevant group. Consequently, we examined individuals’ tightness-looseness to address one aspect of how cultural values might moderate any relationship between RF and EB. We specifically hypothesize that RF would be more likely to cause EB in groups where religious fundamentalists have a higher level of tightness (Hypothesis 2). This hypothesis was derived from recognition that fundamentalist groups vary in terms of how they respond to violations of adherence to given religious and social norms.

Finally, we expected that tightness scores would also moderate the relationship between RF and CN (Hypothesis 3). Our rationale here was that greater levels of fundamentalism would result in

individuals favoring their ingroup over outgroup but that this would not always be accompanied by insecure ingroup love. In particular, we expected this would not be the case when a given fundamentalist group was more tolerant toward outgroups. Previous research suggests that RF is more likely to give rise to intergroup aggression when group values are perceived to be threatened (e.g., Ysseldyk et al., 2010). Such threats need not be overt attacks but can refer to the promotion of values that are different from those that fundamentalists hold to be absolute truths and thus represent a challenge to their views. In addition to variation in responses to outgroups, religious fundamentalists can also vary in how tolerant they are of deviations from group norms. Individuals and groups that are more tolerant to deviation are less likely to feel threatened by internal deviations and thus to respond in a defensive manner to deviation to protect their group's "greatness." Putting these elements together, we expect that tightness scores would moderate the mediating effect of CN on the relationship between RF and EB (Hypothesis 4).

## Method

### Participants and Procedure

As we wanted to collect data from a variety of different types of Islamic organizations (i.e., political and nonpolitical groups), we invited Muslims who were members of two Sunni Islamic organizations in Indonesia, namely, the Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) and Nadhatul Ulama (NU). PKS is an Islamic political party in Indonesia and advances a conservative fundamentalist ideology. NU, in contrast, is one of the largest nonpolitical religious organizations in the world and represents a more moderate and tolerant form of Sunni Islam, one that expresses respect for the indigenous culture and traditions of Indonesia. There were in total 835 recruited as participants in Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, and Bekasi (male = 470, female = 331).

Our participants ages ranged from 17 to 52 ( $M = 25.14$ ,  $SD = 8.49$ ). Due to missing values and low-quality answers, 47 responses were removed from analysis, leaving a final sample of  $N = 787$  (194 PKS members and 593 NU members). The study was presented as research concerning the impact of events on different groups and how the ingroup members feel about their groups. The measures collected in this study were part of a larger questionnaire that examined these topics. Ethics approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Psychology at Universitas Indonesia. We obtained informed consent from all participants before they began to answer the questionnaire. Participants completed the questionnaire with the assistance of research assistants when necessary. Upon finishing the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and provided with a small gift as appreciation for participation.

### Measures

Data were collected using physical questionnaires. The questionnaire began with an informed consent section in which the participants confirmed their agreement to voluntarily participate in this research. Subsequently, participants were asked questions about their group experiences and how they felt about their group; in these sections, the measures reported in this study of intratextual

fundamentalism, tightness-looseness, CN, and endorsement of EB were collected. Last, participants were asked to complete a demographics section that asked about their gender, age, ethnicity, and involvement with religious organizations. All scales were measured on 7-point scales.

**RF.** We used three items of the intratextual fundamentalism scale previously adapted by Muluk et al. (2013) to be contextually appropriate for Indonesian Muslims. The items measured how strongly participants believed in the Quran as the primary and unalterable source of truth (see the [online supplemental material](#) for full items). Participants were asked to answer three items on a 7-point response scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*). The Cronbach's alpha score for the combined scale was  $\alpha = .78$ . Corrected item-total correlations ranged from .52 to .71.

**CN.** We measured CN by translating the CN scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). The measure consisted of nine items and used the relevant religious organizations as the reference group being evaluated in all items, for example, "I want other groups in this country to acknowledge the authority of PKS/NU as soon as possible," "PKS/NU members deserve to receive special treatment," and "I will never be satisfied until PKS/NU members get all their deserved accolades" (see the [online supplemental material](#) for a complete list of items). The items formed a reliable scale ( $\alpha = .75$ ). Corrected item-total correlations ranged from .16 to .58.

**Tightness and looseness (tightness).** We measured tightness and looseness (TL) by translating the TL scale developed in previous studies (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2013). The items measured the level of normative tightness within the group, which in this context referred to the extent to which participants believed their religious group would punish deviances of group norms (see the [online supplemental material](#) for full items). Higher scores on the TL scale meant greater levels of perceived tightness while lower scores meant lower levels of tightness and hence a looser perceived group culture. There were initially six items included, but two items were deleted due to low reliability scores. The remaining four items formed a reliable scale ( $\alpha = .72$ ). Corrected item-total correlations ranged from .63 to .86.

**EB.** We measured EB by using the willingness to fight and die scale, which examines the extent to which group members are willing to endorse fighting and dying for their group and other group members when they are threatened (see [online supplemental material](#) for the detailed items). This scale was adapted from studies by Swann, Jr., Gómez, Seyle, Morales, and Huici (2009), Swann et al. (2014). The Cronbach's alpha score for this translated scale was  $\alpha = .87$  (corrected item-total correlations ranged from .31 to .62).

## Results

### Preliminary Results

Inspections of independent  $t$  tests detected differences between sexes on scores of intratextual fundamentalism,  $t(797) = 4.76$ ,  $p < .001$  ( $M_{men} = 5.23$ ,  $SD = 1.60$ ;  $M_{women} = 5.75$ ,  $SD = 1.39$ ), and on EB,  $t(794) = 2.77$ ,  $p < .01$  ( $M_{men} = 3.92$ ,  $SD = 1.40$ ;  $M_{women} = 3.65$ ,  $SD = 1.32$ ). These patterns suggested that women on average were more religious than men, and men and were more likely to endorse EB for their group than women. As seen in [Table 1](#), there were no significant correlation of age with key variables,

Table 1  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations of Study Variables

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Religious fundamentalism	5.44	1.54	—	.215**	.278**	.447**	.166**	.043
2. Collective narcissism	4.67	0.94		—	.242**	.353**	-.012	-.051
3. Tightness-looseness value	5.38	0.96			—	.352**	-.039	.102**
4. Extreme behavior	3.81	1.38				—	-.098**	-.057
5. Gender	1.41	0.493					—	-.006
6. Age	25.08	8.327						—

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ .

except for tightness,  $r = .105$ ,  $p < .01$ . Consequently, for our main analyses, we entered gender as a covariate but excluded age.

### Mediation Analysis

To examine the potential mediating effects of CN on the relationship between RF and EB, we used conditional process modeling as outlined by Hayes (2013) using the PROCESS macro (Model 4) with 5,000 bootstrapped samples. Our analysis revealed that RF and CN accounted for 29% of the variance in EB scores,  $R^2 = .29$ ,  $F(3, 782) = 106.49$ . Additionally, the results confirmed that there was also a direct significant effect of RF on EB ( $B = .26$ ,  $SE = .03$ ,  $t = 9.43$ ,  $p < .001$ , 95% CI [.21, .31]) and CN on EB ( $B = .56$ ,  $SE = .02$ ,  $t = 12.3$ ,  $p < .001$ , 95% CI [.468, .645]). The effect of RF on EB was partially mediated by CN ( $B = .08$ ,  $SE = .02$ , 95% CI [.05, .11]).

### Moderated Regressions

In this section, we present the results of an analysis examining EB and CN as predicted by RF  $\times$  tightness. Here, RF (the focal predictor/F; mean centered), tightness (the moderator/M), and their cross-product (F  $\times$  M) were entered as predictors for both EB and CN. When EB was entered as the outcome variable (see Figure 1), the analysis resulted in a significant regression equation,  $R^2 = .229$ ,  $F(4, 782) = 58.057$ ,  $p < .001$ . This regression also revealed a significant interaction between RF and tightness on EB ( $B = .09$ ,  $SE = .03$ ,  $t = 3.1$ ,  $p < .001$ , 95% CI [.037, .146]). Furthermore,

as seen in Figure 1, inspections of a simple slope analysis revealed that at a low score on the tightness scale (1 and 3 on the scale), the effect of RF on EB was not significant (M value = 1:  $B = -.12$ ,  $SE = .12$ ,  $t = -.97$ ,  $p = .33$ ; M value = 3:  $B = .06$ ,  $SE = .07$ ,  $t = .90$ ,  $p = .37$ ). In contrast, at high values on the tightness scale (5 or 7 on the scale), the effect of RF on EB was positively significant (M value = 5:  $B = .25$ ,  $SE = .03$ ,  $p < .001$ ; M value = 7:  $B = .43$ ,  $SE = .05$ ,  $t = 7.85$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

Alternatively, when CN was inserted as the outcome variable (see Figure 2), the overall analysis also resulted in a significant regression equation,  $R^2 = .110$ ,  $F(4, 782) = 24.01$ ,  $p < .001$ , and again an interactive effect was found between RF and tightness on CN ( $B = .06$ ,  $SE = .02$ ,  $t = 2.84$ ,  $p < .01$ , 95% CI [.018, .098]). Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 2, inspections of a simple slope analysis again demonstrated that at low points on the tightness scale (1 or 3 on the scale), the effect of RF on CN was not significant (M value = 1:  $B = -.15$ ,  $SE = .09$ ,  $t = -1.65$ ,  $p = .10$ ; M value = 3:  $B = -.03$ ,  $SE = .05$ ,  $t = -.65$ ,  $p = .51$ ). In contrast, at high scores on the tightness scale (5 or 7 on the scale), the effect of RF on CN was positively significant (M value = 5:  $B = .08$ ,  $SE = .02$ ,  $p < .001$ ; M value = 7:  $B = .20$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $t = 4.88$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

### Combining Model of Moderation and Mediation: The Relationship Between RF, TL, CN, and EB

In this section, we present the results of a combined model that examined the mediating role of CN while accounting for the moderating role of tightness on the relationship between RF and




Figure 1. Interaction effect of religious fundamentalism and tightness-looseness value on extreme behavior.




Figure 2. Interaction effect of religious fundamentalism and tightness-looseness value on collective narcissism.

EB (while controlling for gender as a covariate). For this analysis, we used the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013, Model 8), with bootstrapping set to 5,000 samples. In the previous section, we reported that there was a significant interaction of RF  $\times$  Tightness on EB, but when CN was entered into a model together as a predictor of EB, this effect was reduced but remained significant ( $B = .06$ ,  $SE = .03$ ,  $t = 2.30$ ,  $p = .02$ ). Furthermore, the overall index of moderated mediation was significant ( $B = .029$ , boot  $SE = .013$ , 95% CI [.005, .055]). More specifically, the model revealed that among participants with low tightness scores (1 SD below mean), CN did not significantly mediate the relationship between RF and EB (indirect effect = .02, boot  $SE = .02$ , 95% CI [-.01, .05]). However, among participants with high tightness scores (see Figure 3), RF significantly mediated the relationship between RF and EB (indirect effect = .08, boot  $SE = .02$ , 95% CI [.05, .13]). These findings were in accordance with Hypothesis 4, predicting that the level of tightness would moderate the mediation effect of CN on the relationship between RF and EB.<sup>1</sup>

## Discussion

The aims of the present study were to explore whether RF and perceptions of group tightness had interactive effects on EB and CN. To address this issue, we conducted a study that examined members of two different Islamic religious groups in Indonesia. Our findings demonstrated that RF is more likely to predict endorsement of EB when individuals perceive their groups as sharing tighter adherence to social norms and less tolerance toward deviants. Similarly, RF is more likely to lead to higher levels of CN when individuals perceive their groups as adhering to tighter norms. Mediation analysis revealed that CN could partly account for the relationship between RF and endorsement of EB. Perceptions of tightness were also found to influence the mediating effect of CN on the relationship between RF and endorsement of EB. That is, mediation effects were stronger when groups were perceived as following tighter norms.

The present study offers a number of theoretical contributions. First, it provides evidence that the relationship between RF and EB is affected by contextual factors such as perceived tightness-looseness. This finding accords with previous studies on RF and violence. Putra et al. (2018), for example, discuss the issue of ex-jihadists who remain high in terms of their belief in fundamentalist ideologies but are more flexible in how they respond to other outgroups. Similarly, Putra and Sukabdi (2014) suggest that although most Islamic fundamentalists retain a goal of achieving a state based on Islamic law (sharia), they are strongly divided in terms of the strategies they consider acceptable to achieve their political goals (e.g., whether they endorse peaceful or violent actions). Erikha, Putra, and Sarwono (2016) also found that while news media websites, including Voice of Al Islam (VOA) and Arrahmah, are similar in terms of their level of fundamentalism, they demonstrate radically different perspectives on how justified the actions of ISIS are (i.e., VOA tends to support ISIS, while Arrahmah tends to reject ISIS).


Second, we provided empirical evidence to help better explain the conditions under which RF can lead to endorsement of EB. As discussed, RF has been shown to be closely related to ingroup favoritism (e.g., Cairns et al., 2006; Castano et al., 2002; Lyons et

al., 2010; Wann & Grieve, 2005), and there is clear evidence that religious fundamentalists strongly favor their ingroup over religious outgroups. When this ingroup love is secure, such ingroup favoritism can be beneficial for the group (Cichocka, 2016). However, when the ingroup love is insecure, such strong attachment to the ingroup could be detrimental because it can result in CN, leading people to seek recognition from outgroups of their group's "greatness" and potentially endorsing violence (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009).

Relatedly, the present study demonstrates that the effect of RF on CN was not significant when individuals perceived their groups as being lower in levels of normative tightness. One plausible interpretation of these findings is that lower levels of tightness would make religious fundamentalists less likely to interpret the actions of others who deviate from group norms as a sign of disrespect or disapproval. Since individuals with lower tightness and greater "looseness" tend to display greater tolerance of deviant behavior (Gelfand et al., 2011, 2013), it is likely that such individuals will not regard others failing to abide by their group norms as impacting their group's "greatness." Conversely, those with higher normative tightness are likely to be less tolerant toward deviant behavior and may undertake, or endorse, actions aimed at protecting their group values and beliefs. This interpretation is further supported by the moderating effect of tightness on the relationship between RF and EB. Due to this interactive effect, it is possible in specific circumstances for religious fundamentalists to be strongly committed to their particular beliefs and still be relatively tolerant to others who do not comply with their group norms. This would make them less likely to take defensive actions to protect their group from perceived threats, including symbolic threats to group values.

Despite the theoretical and practical contributions of the present study, a number of limitations must be acknowledged. First, the study only collected data from two Sunni organizations in Indonesia—namely, the PKS and NU groups—and although these groups differ in their level of political engagements and character, this is not a nationally representative sample. Given that there are a wide variety of Islamic groups in Indonesia and across the world, and they have highly variable characteristics, it will be important to replicate this study in other types of Islamic groups, including those that have much more extreme group values (e.g., HTI, or supporters of ISIS), in order to examine whether the mechanisms identified are consistent in different contexts. Second, we conducted this study in a country in which Muslims are the majority and thus have more "privilege" and status than minority religious groups. This context affords Indonesian Muslims more opportunity to express their opinions and behaviors freely, even when these involve prejudices toward other religious groups (see Putra & Wagner, 2017). Thus, further research is necessary in countries where Muslims represent a minority in order to test the validity of the proposed model on the relationship between RF, CN, and tightness on EB. Finally, we also need to examine other religious

<sup>1</sup> When we examined data from PKS and NU group members separately, we found the moderation and mediation analyses to produce similar results in both groups as with the combined data. However, in the moderated mediation analysis, the moderated mediation was significant only for NU members but not for PKS members. We report further details of this finding in the online supplemental material.



**Figure 3.** Moderated mediation: the role of tightness-looseness in moderating the relationship between religious fundamentalism and extreme behavior through collective narcissism. Coefficients in brackets represent effects from low level of the tightness-looseness value. Path coefficients are unstandardized estimates. \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .001$ . ns, not significant.

traditions to address whether the relationship is specific to an Islamic context, although we do not anticipate this to be the case.

In summary, the results indicated that the effect of RF on both EB and CN is moderated by perceived normative tightness within relevant groups. This demonstrates the importance of adequately addressing potential moderating cultural factors in any analyses that seek to better understand the relationship between RF and support for EB. The present study suggests that people can be peaceful religious fundamentalists if they belong to a more tolerant group or culture. As such, the rise of RF in certain countries, particularly in Indonesia, may not be as straightforwardly linked to violence extremism as many fear.

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